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THE ROLES OF LITIGATION 
 STEPHEN B. BURBANK∗ 
It has been my pleasure, over a number of years, to assist the Institute 
for Law and Economic Policy (ILEP) in planning and presenting 
conferences on topics of interest to the bar, the bench, and the academy. 
When Edward Labaton asked me to take the lead in organizing the 
conference out of which this issue of the Law Quarterly emerged, it 
seemed a good opportunity to recruit interesting people to pursue themes 
that are or should be of concern to those who conduct, preside over, or 
study litigation. 
The 2002 ILEP conference, “Litigation in a Free Society,” was divided 
into five program segments, each of which is represented by at least one 
Article here. Taken as a whole those program segments constitute one 
view of, or perspective on, the critical issues that confront litigation in the 
United States at the start of the millennium. 
The first segment, “Litigation: Evidence or Emotion?,” posed the 
question of the extent to which policy debates concerning litigation and 
the various statutory and other rules that attempt to shape the roles it plays 
should and can be disciplined or informed by facts. Unfortunately, a 
misunderstanding concerning the ground rules for publication and the 
relationship between lead papers, comments, and replies has deprived us 
of the interesting Article that was presented by Professors Kevin Clermont 
and Theodore Eisenberg. Fortunately, most of the underlying empirical 
work that the authors summarized and discussed is already in the public 
domain,1 and their Article is available in another journal.2 On question 
after question, from the proposition that restricting jury trials would reduce 
delay3 to the notion that internationally foreign litigants fare badly in U.S. 
courts,4 Clermont and Eisenberg have provided facts that call in question 
 ∗ © 2002 Stephen B. Burbank. David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: 
Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 125 (2001); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Kevin M. Clermont & 
Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates 
and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (1996) [hereinafter Xenophilia]. 
 2. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(2002).  
 3. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which is Speedier?, 
79 JUDICATURE 176 (1996). 
 4. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 1. 
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widely held views.  
In this, of course, Clermont and Eisenberg are hardly unique. Empirical 
studies that debunk claims about various aspects of the U.S. litigation 
landscape have been available for decades, and the work of Marc Galanter 
in particular has long given them prominence in the legal literature.5 Yet, 
Clermont’s and Eisenberg’s work is noteworthy for at least two reasons. 
First, they are law professors who came to empirical work without formal 
training in another social science discipline and after establishing their 
scholarly credentials in more traditional ways. Second, their work 
demonstrates possibilities to cast light on empirical questions by using 
existing databases. It thus offers reason to hope that more scholars whose 
primary allegiance is to law will be drawn to empirical inquiry, reassured 
that others have done it without expending years, or having to rely on 
external grants, to gather the data. 
If the time and money required to do empirical work have contributed 
to the traditional reluctance of law professors to engage in it, so also has 
their lack of relevant professional training. Quantitative methods have 
become vastly more sophisticated since Underhill Moore studied parking 
in New Haven.6 Whether, however, disillusionment with that part of the 
realists’ project contributed to law faculties circling the wagons, the circle 
has long been broken. The resources for self-education in quantitative 
methods, as well as for collaborative work with those already privy to their 
secrets, exist in most good law schools today. 
The reference to the “realists’ project” may bring to mind another 
traditional barrier to the pursuit of empirical work by law professors: to 
wit, the lack of a perceived pay-off,7 particularly for those early in their 
careers and hence concerned about promotion and tenure. Clermont and 
Eisenberg show that such work can be of interest to prominent journals, 
and they are by no means the only examples. 
The perception of scholarly pay-offs, being part of the academic utility 
function,8 lies in the eye of the beholder. For that reason and because of 
 5. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); 
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We 
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). 
 6. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 30-35 (1986); John H. 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill 
Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980). 
 7. See KALMAN, supra note 6, at 34-35. 
 8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 81-144 (1995); Stephen B. Burbank & Barry 
Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 11 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002). 
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changes in the scholarship produced in law schools, one should perhaps 
mark a distinction between that which a scholar pursues because it is 
likely to advance his or her career and that which beckons because it is 
likely to contribute useful knowledge about the legal system.9 For a 
scholar of the latter persuasion, skepticism about the impact of empirical 
work need not rest only on the failures of the realists.10 Yet, at least in one 
lawmaking arena where the rules of the game are made—federal 
supervisory court rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act—there has 
been a sea change in attitudes towards the use of empirical study to inform 
the enterprise, with the result that the question is no longer whether but 
when and how.11 
It seems neither disrespectful of other disciplines nor overly protective 
of my own to suggest that securing the interest of more law professors in 
empirical work is important if data are to replace anecdotes in policy 
debates concerning, and as the predicates of, changes in the rules of the 
litigation game. That interest need not extend to the conduct of empirical 
research, whether with data created as part of the project or with those 
already existing. Certainly, law professors have the opportunity in their 
teaching to focus the attention of future policymakers, including future 
lawmakers, on the empirical perspective; the opportunity in their 
scholarship both to place their own findings and to translate findings by 
others (including those in other disciplines) in journals such individuals 
may be likely to read; and the opportunity in both to show the way to the 
responsible use of empirical data 
Here, of course, the Article by Judge Edwards and Ms. Elliott, 
criticizing one aspect of Clermont’s and Eisenberg’s empirical work, 
sounds a cautionary note,12 as did the comments at the conference of 
Professor Deborah Hensler, a distinguished social scientist and law 
professor who, as head of RAND’s Institute for Civil Justice, has been 
 9. Those who rebel at such a distinction may share Professor Geyh’s view that public choice 
theory—here as applied to scholars rather than judges—is “tautological and explains nothing” if it 
permits including the desire to benefit others among that which an actor seeks to maximize. Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in 
Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1216 (1996).  
 10. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, “Between Cup and Lip”: Social Science Influences on Law and 
Policy, 10 LAW & POL’Y 167 (1988). 
 11. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and 
When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 242 (1997); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 
23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (1996); Thomas E. Willging, Past 
and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002). 
 12. See Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of 
Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002). 
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involved in some of the most ambitious empirical studies of litigation ever 
undertaken.13  
Judge Edwards is no stranger to debates about the use and limits of 
social science research in the study of legal institutions.14 An 
accomplished scholar himself, he is also a distinguished judge who is 
properly concerned about the reputation of the judiciary. He understands 
that the standards which may currently lend prominence to a work of legal 
scholarship and enhance an author’s career are not necessarily the 
standards called for when serious people have serious things to do.15 He 
understands, therefore, that both that which is intended as playful or 
provocative and that which is offered as the most probable inference to be 
drawn from empirical data can do unwarranted harm. Thus, whether his 
questions involve research methodology for conducting a study or the 
inferences that are drawn from the results,16 Judge Edwards reminds us 
that scholars have an indefeasible obligation to attend to the potential 
consequences of their work and a corresponding obligation to take greater 
care the more serious those potential consequences are.  
Readers of Judge Edwards’ and Ms. Elliott’s Article can make an 
independent evaluation of the force of their criticisms of the work of 
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg only after reading the articles upon 
which they are based.17 It would be difficult to disagree with the notion 
that the data resulting from empirical inquiry alone often don’t provide an 
adequate basis for normative judgment or policy prescription. In making 
such an independent evaluation, however, the reader should keep in mind 
that the criticisms in question here concern merely one aspect of work that, 
taken as a whole, ranges widely over numerous questions implicating 
public policy concerning litigation. And taken as a whole that work does 
demonstrate that (relatively) unvarnished facts at least have the potential to 
discipline rhetoric and hence, perhaps, to derail improvident lawmaking. 
 13. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF 
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). 
 14. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1335 (1998).  
 15. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 
MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986).  
 16. In her comments at the conference, Professor Hensler observed that there are “huge obstacles 
to drawing valid inferences about legal behavior,” and that there is very little theory available to guide 
empirical research. In the latter regard, she concluded that perhaps the best “we can hope for are little 
theories.”  
 17. I am informed that Professors Clermont and Eisenberg have prepared a response for 
publication in a forthcoming issue of the Law Quarterly. 
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The second segment of the 2002 ILEP conference program, 
“Contingent Fee Litigation,” sought a more focused examination of the 
same questions posed in the first, one that drew on experience in other 
countries as well as experience in this country. We were fortunate to 
persuade Professor Herbert Kritzer, a political scientist at the University of 
Wisconsin, to present the main Article.18 Professor Hazel Genn of 
University College London, who has done pioneering empirical research 
on civil justice processes and access to justice in England, and Robert 
Heim of the Dechert firm, a nationally acclaimed class action litigator and 
important contributor to federal civil rulemaking, served as commentators. 
Professor Kritzer’s Article draws on his extensive work on the 
contingency fee, work that, together with empirical studies of other 
aspects of litigation, has marked him as one of the most influential (as well 
as wide-ranging) social scientists in the country on litigation-related 
questions. In it he debunks “seven dogged myths” concerning the 
contingency fee, from the notion that contingency fees are a uniquely 
American phenomenon to the notion that most contingency fee lawyers 
accept most of the cases presented to them by people seeking their 
services. The latter myth, of course, is but a variation of another, 
elsewhere put to rest by Professor Kritzer but one that, like the Phoenix, is 
remarkably resilient. That is the myth that the contingency fee is to blame 
for much of the supposedly frivolous litigation with which our courts are 
supposedly burdened. Of course, this myth is all the more surprising in the 
age of Law and Economics, since one would assume that, as rational 
actors, contingency fee lawyers pick and choose their cases, mindful that 
the dollars spent on losers are their own. Professor Kritzer’s work has 
provided evidence that this assumption is correct and thus that those who 
regard frivolous litigation as a serious problem should look elsewhere for a 
whipping boy.19 
Two of Professor Kritzer’s most interesting findings, each contrary to 
widespread beliefs, are that (1) most contingency fee lawyers are much 
more likely to rely on referrals from other lawyers and current and former 
clients than they are on print or direct mail advertising and (2) the interests 
of contingency fee lawyers and their clients do not routinely diverge. 
These findings are perhaps most interesting because they are related. The 
 18. Herbert Kritzer, The Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 
739 (2002). 
 19. See Herbert Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 
JUDICATURE 22 (1997); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 183, 212-15 (2001).  
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former finding makes it harder to single out the contingency fee as causal 
of changes in the profession one often hears associated with (usually in 
terms of decline) release from restraints on advertising and direct mail 
solicitation.20 Of course, some of those harboring such views probably 
regard contingency fee practice with disdain in any event, in much the 
same way as has been customary in Britain, where it used to be called 
“litigation on spec.”21 The latter finding makes it harder to believe that 
contingency fee lawyers are peculiarly afflicted or disabled by conflicts of 
interest. Purveyors of that view have always had to contend with 
knowledge that hourly billing carries its own conflicts baggage.22 Kritzer’s 
work adds the element of concern about reputation to the mix, an element 
that his finding about the importance of referrals renders wholly 
unsurprising. 
Just as hand-wringing about the decline of the legal profession, 
whether traced to the advent of advertising or some other cause, may be no 
more than a pious mask for disappointment at the loss of income resulting 
from increased competition (or for something worse),23 so may 
demonstrations of disdain for the contingency fee. From that perspective 
(nay, probably from any perspective), it seems remarkable that within 
approximately a decade the British went from a position of virtual 
prohibition of “litigation on spec” to virtually universal tolerance of its 
somewhat more discreet cousin, the conditional fee. Indeed, as indicated in 
 20. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 
(1977). Compare Florida Bar v. Went-For-It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (approving ban on direct mail 
solicitation of accident victims and their relatives for thirty days). 
 If civil justice in the United States is in ferment, it is no greater than the ferment besetting 
the legal profession. Indeed, the two phenomena may be related. There is reason to question 
whether there is any longer a “legal profession,” if by that term one means a group of trained 
individuals pursuing a set of common goals and united, even if loosely, by shared values. To 
be sure, in comparative context American lawyers have long been relatively entrepreneurial. 
With the advent of lawyer advertising, price competition, and other pressures towards what 
the advertising world calls “product differentiation,” entrepreneurship may be American 
lawyers’ most salient shared characteristic. And it is the hallmark of an entrepreneur to try to 
obtain a competitive advantage. 
Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The 
United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 691 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  
 21. See id. 
 22. See Kritzer, supra note 18, at 773 n.91. 
 23.  
The social revolution of the 1960s, the quest for diversity on the bench it initiated, and the 
changes in the legal profession brought about both by that revolution and by the revolution of 
competition all may have contributed to the dissolution of the ties that bound bench and bar, 
which ties included shared professional values and a shared sense of abusive conduct.  
Burbank, supra note 11, at 225 (footnote omitted). 
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Professor Kritzer’s paper,24 and as emerged even more clearly in the oral 
comments of Professor Genn, “tolerance” does not do justice to this volte-
face. For, the initial acceptance and spread of the conditional fee in 
England resulted from increasing pressure on the legal aid budget and the 
eventual recognition that it could no longer support civil litigation by the 
middle class. We see in that relationship dramatic evidence, were it 
needed, of the importance of the conditional/contingent fee to access to 
court. Because the United States has never provided legal aid for civil 
cases that is worthy of the name, and because private litigation here has 
long served roles that in other countries are addressed through social 
insurance, administrative law, and the like, disdain for the contingency fee 
could always properly have been regarded as support for the status quo, or, 
less charitably, for unequal access to court.25 
Finally, careful readers of Professor Kritzer’s Article will note respects 
in which his findings vary depending on the type of contingency fee 
practice.26 It thus reminds us of the potential dangers of drawing a map of 
litigation on the basis of only one part, usually the most prominent, of the 
landscape. In that regard, most of the complaints I hear about the 
contingency fee relate to a few litigations—asbestos and tobacco—that are 
hardly typical of the run either of tort (including mass tort) litigation or of 
contingency fee practice.27 The misguided approach to procedural reform 
that treats all litigation as if it were complex litigation can at least be 
explained, if not justified, by the quest for uniform and transsubstantive 
regulation that has preoccupied modern American procedural policy.28 No 
such justification is available when those who seek to “reform” the 
contingency fee, or any other aspect of litigation finance, seek to define 
problems by reference to the extraordinary instead of the ordinary.29 
The third program segment of the 2002 ILEP conference, “The 
Holocaust and other Human Rights Litigation,” considered the prospects 
for the use of litigation to enforce fundamental human rights, a possible 
way also to begin to understand the limits of litigation in the emerging 
 24. See Kritzer, supra note 18, at 746-47. 
 25. See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 20, at 691-95; Yeazell, supra note 19, at 191 n.31, 
211. 
 26. See Kritzer, supra note 18, at 752-53, 756-57, 769-72. 
 27. See Yeazell, supra note 19, at 207-11. 
 28. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (book review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 
1465 (1987) [hereinafter Costs of Complexity]; Burbank, supra note 11, at 225-26; Stephen B. 
Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 515 (1996) [hereinafter Procedure and 
Power].  
 29. See Yeazell, supra note 19, at 216-17. 
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world order. A medical emergency prevented Professor Burt Neuborne 
from attending the conference, but his Article was ably summarized and 
supplemented by Melvyn Weiss, an extraordinary lawyer by any measure. 
Two sets of comments, the first by Professor Harold Koh, a prolific 
scholar, human rights lawyer, and official advocate, and the second by 
Samuel Baumgartner, put the issues raised in Professor Neuborne’s Article 
in larger theoretical and comparative contexts. We present here Professor 
Neuborne’s Article30 and Mr. Baumgartner’s commentary.31  
Professor Neuborne is a distinguished scholar of constitutional and 
civil rights law who, over many years, has bridged the gap between the 
academy and the profession by practicing what he preaches. His Article is 
a very interesting chronicle of some of the holocaust-era litigation by a 
major player in that litigation. Without pretending to objectivity,32 
Professor Neuborne nonetheless poses a variety of hard questions about 
the litigation in which he was so centrally involved and for the success of 
which he undoubtedly deserves great credit.33 
Mr. Baumgartner is a Swiss academic and public servant who has a 
rare appreciation of both the civil law and common law systems and a rare 
ability to conjoin deep knowledge of doctrine with theoretical and other 
perspectives that help to ensure that it remains our servant rather than our 
master. His commentary suggests that Professor Neuborne’s account poses 
even harder questions for the future of human rights enforcement, 
including enforcement through litigation. 
Passing the rather different views of certain foreign legal systems taken 
in these two contributions,34 perhaps the most troubling suggestion in Mr. 
Baumgartner’s commentary is that the “success” of Professor Neuborne 
and his colleagues may have been purchased at considerable cost, not just 
to the cause of human rights enforcement, but to American interests in 
other realms entirely. In that regard, some of the foreign attitudes that he 
reports as having been generated by the holocaust litigation sound familiar 
at a time when the American President’s efforts to win support for action 
 30. Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American 
Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002). 
 31. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States Courts: the 
Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835 (2002). 
 32. See Neuborne, supra note 30, at 797-98. 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 827-35. For a collection and discussion of the many difficult legal questions 
in this litigation that were never resolved, see Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the Nazi Labor 
Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503 (2002). See also id. at 504 (“The published 
material is largely narrative and over-enthusiastic while the massive scholarship of lawyers and experts 
on both sides lies buried in court files.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 34. Compare Neuborne, supra note 30, at 831-32, with Baumgartner, supra note 31, at 847-49. 
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in Iraq dominate the news media. 
More generally, Mr. Baumgartner suggests that the litigation Professor 
Neuborne chronicles might have come out differently if conducted in other 
countries, not because their legal systems are “stacked in favor of 
defendants,” “hostile to the claims set forth in the Holocaust cases,” or 
“fortress[es] for the powerful,”35 but because other countries have very 
different views about the roles that civil litigation (and judges) properly 
can play in social ordering.36 As is true generally of comparative law, this 
perspective may be most valuable for whatever light it casts on our own 
arrangements. 
If, as the Supreme Court has instructed us, it is a mistake to insist that 
ordinary disputes involving Americans be resolved in our courts, 
according to our law,37 we should at least consider whether the same is 
true of extraordinary disputes. That is not only, and not primarily, because, 
as we have seen, people may not distinguish between them. It is one thing 
to insist that foreign corporations with appropriate affiliations to this 
country be subject to suit here, or that they “agree to live by the legal rules 
that allowed the social and economic system to flourish,”38 and quite 
another that the disputes involving them should be resolved by a “legal 
process” that, at the end of the day, has very little to do with law, whatever 
democratic legal system one chooses for perspective on that question. 
Views such as these are not likely to win friends, although I hope that 
they can influence people even when the litigation that prompts them 
involved perhaps the most sympathetic victims of perhaps the most 
vicious evil ever perpetrated. They are similar to the view I have 
elsewhere expressed of the critical importance of fidelity to law (including 
recognized means of changing it) by American judges in domestic 
disputes, even those most heart-wrenching.39 There are limits to the 
 35. Neuborne, supra note 30, at 832. 
 36. See Baumgartner, supra note 31, at 851-52; see also id. at 840. 
 37. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639-40 n.21 
(1985); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 1, 9 (1972). The Court has hardly been faithful to 
that instruction, however. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural 
Law for International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Summer 1994).  
 38. Neuborne, supra note 30, at 831. 
 39.  
[F]idelity to the rule of law in a democracy requires that, in the end, the judiciary abide 
irrationality and irresponsibility in the political branches, unless it is manifested in behavior 
that the Constitution, fairly interpreted, reprehends. “Abide” does not mean accept without 
question, or for that matter, without insistence that legislative foolishness be clear for all to 
see.  
Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the 
Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 2009 (1997). 
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malleability of “law,” including constitutional law. We do our courts (and 
ourselves) no favor by committing to them social problems for which 
existing rules provide no solutions and inviting them to transgress those 
limits. For people who believe that law, including international law, is 
nothing more than politics, the question may not be the same, but the 
answer should be, at least unless they can guarantee that the judges of the 
future will share their politics.40 
The last two program segments of the 2002 ILEP conference explored, 
from different perspectives, questions about the control of litigation and 
the best means to reorient it, if reorientation is found to be in order. The 
fourth segment, “Securities Class Actions,” took up again a subject that 
has been a staple of ILEP programs and to which participants in those 
programs have made notable contributions, while the fifth and final 
segment, “Rulemaking and Reform,” investigated the limits of the federal 
court rulemaking enterprise in bringing about change. 
The organizers had two goals in planning the segment on securities 
class actions, both of which are admirably met in the Articles published 
here. The first was to cast the light of empirical investigation on questions 
of importance to the policy decisions made by the Congress when it 
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).41 
The second was to contribute to the then-robust debate concerning the use 
of auctions to select class counsel in securities cases. Apart from the 
authors of the main articles that I describe below, we were blessed with 
superb commentators, from an innovative theorist in the field, Professor 
Adam Pritchard, to an experienced, highly intelligent, and refreshingly 
candid federal judge, Shira Scheindlin.  
For one inclined to skepticism about the public payoffs of empirical 
work, the PSLRA provides no reason for a change of mind. Yet, however 
shaky the empirical foundation of that legislation,42 it would be a mistake 
to quit the house for that reason alone. Experience in the lawmaking 
enterprise that was the focus of attention in the fifth segment, federal 
supervisory court rulemaking, demonstrates that it is possible to shore up a 
shaky empirical foundation, whether to confirm the integrity of the 
original structure or to renovate it.43  
 40. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Chancellor’s Boot, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 31 (1988). 
 41. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
 42. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American Securities Regulation, ZZPInt 
4, at 321, 330 (1999); Burbank, supra note 11, at 246. 
 43. See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 28, at 516 (1993 amendments to Rule 11); 
see also infra note 72. 
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I have previously expressed the view that “theory is an irresponsible 
basis for lawmaking about something as important as access to court.”44 
By that I meant theory untested by experience, preferably experience 
reflected in reliable empirical data. According to that criterion, the PSLRA 
was an irresponsible statute, since a number of its provisions could 
predictably and consequentially affect access to court, and Congress 
lacked reliable empirical data to support the changes in the arrangements 
for securities class actions that those provisions effected.45 From this 
perspective, the fact that Congress seriously considered making other, 
more radical changes provides no solace—indeed, it may be cause for 
greater concern—because the members’ attention was specifically drawn 
to the question of access by the SEC’s pleas not to disable the primary 
vehicle of statutory enforcement.46 
One of the PSLRA’s most prominent innovations, albeit not a change 
that had the most obvious implications for the question of access, reposes 
in its provisions regarding the selection of a lead plaintiff, its rebuttable 
presumption in that regard in favor of the plaintiff with the largest 
financial interest in the relief sought (usually institutional investors), and 
its conferral on the lead plaintiff of the right, subject to court approval, to 
choose counsel for the class.47 It is generally accepted that this innovation 
was adopted from ideas expressed in the legal literature. Those ideas 
reflected in turn both the insights of law and economics concerning the 
behavior of principals and agents and data that seemed to support the 
notion that it might be possible to harness the power of large investors to 
 44. Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1947 (1989); see also id. at 1962 (discussing the “unfairness of pursuing 
sanction theories in the absence of facts, particularly theories that are in tension if not direct conflict 
with basic premises of our legal system and with the articulated premises of Rule 11”). 
 45. See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 20, at 694, 703. 
 46.  
[T]he 1995 legislation was one of the few elements of legislative legal reform successfully 
enacted by a Republican Congress that had a far more ambitious agenda; it was enacted over 
the President’s veto, and its final form was considerably less hostile to private securities 
litigation than the initial bills on which it was based. An important reason for this 
amelioration, I take it, was the strong and consistent voice of the [SEC], which repeatedly 
reminded Congress of the critical role that private litigation plays in the enforcement of the 
securities laws and of the Commission’s inability to perform equivalently under any 
realistically conceivable funding scenario. 
Burbank, supra note 42, at 330 (footnote omitted). Describing his ongoing research, Professor Cox 
stated that of a sample of 265 securities class actions issuing in a settlement, only nine involved 
situations that resulted in any SEC enforcement action. Telephone interview with Professor James D. 
Cox, Duke Law School (Oct. 4, 2002). 
 47. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2002). 
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solve the problem of agency costs in securities class actions.48 
Professors James Cox, a major academic figure in the corporate law 
area, has been a mainstay of ILEP’s efforts to increase knowledge about 
securities litigation over many years. Here he and Professor Randall 
Thomas have contributed an interesting Article that seeks to shed light on 
some of the theoretical and empirical assumptions underlying the lead 
plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA.49 Thus, their review of cases decided 
under that statute leads them to conclude that “the lead plaintiff provision 
has not eliminated the strong interest of class counsel in the initiation of 
securities class actions, so that they remain lawyer-driven notwithstanding 
the PSLRA.”50 They also report and begin to ask questions raised by data 
suggesting that institutional investors may not seek lead counsel status in a 
substantial number of cases and may even be dispreferred in some. But the 
burden of their paper is to explore with data rather than anecdotes the 
reported phenomenon of institutional investors failing to submit claims in 
securities class actions that have been settled and to do so, moreover, 
within the framework of the duties owed by such institutions to their 
investors.  
Professors Cox’s and Thomas’s data, the imperfections of which they 
candidly acknowledge,51 lead them to the tentative conclusion that 
institutional investors are not in many instances filing claims to money to 
which they are entitled and which it may be their legal duty to collect. 
Rather, however, than advocating any one explanation for that 
phenomenon, they are admirably content to note explanations that have 
previously been suggested, as well as to add their own speculations in that 
regard, all as part of an agenda for more research. 
It is quite obvious that, in commenting on the Cox and Thomas Article, 
Professor Adam Pritchard has his own agenda, which is to reorient the 
goal of securities class actions from compensation to deterrence, if not to 
replace them all together with alternative methods of policing securities 
fraud.52 Critical to the argument he constructs is the inference he draws 
from the main paper that “the compensation provided by securities class 
actions to defrauded investors has a negligible effect on investment 
 48. See Elliott J. Weiss & John Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). 
 49. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional 
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002). 
 50. Id. at 858-59. 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 872-73. 
 52. See Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (2002). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/1
p705 Burbank book pages.doc   1/13/03 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] THE ROLES OF LITIGATION 717 
 
 
 
 
 
returns”53 and the support he finds in it for the proposition that “[o]ne of 
the principal arguments of defenders of securities fraud class actions—that 
they provide important compensation to defrauded investors—is 
impossible to square with the available evidence.”54 
Perhaps I am out of my depth—I am certainly out of my field—but I 
would have thought that, although the Cox and Thomas Article provides 
reason to doubt whether institutional investors are satisfying, or are likely 
to satisfy, Congress’s expectations in passing the PSLRA, it is not the gift 
that Professor Pritchard would like it to be. Put another way, I do not find 
in the Cox and Thomas Article that which would be necessary to turn 
Pritchard’s theory into a responsible basis for lawmaking.  
Just because Congress turned to large investors to help solve perceived 
problems in securities class actions does not mean that such lawsuits are 
made possible exclusively or primarily for their benefit. The latter 
proposition certainly does not square with my recollection of the historical 
background of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Perhaps it is true that “investors 
seeking to protect themselves from fraud do so through diversification, not 
lawsuits.”55 Others of less sophistication or with fewer resources may rely, 
as we have encouraged them to rely, on the integrity of our securities 
markets.56 Particularly at a time when greater resort to those markets by 
average Americans is touted as the solution to a variety of social problems, 
it would seem passing strange to tell them that compensation for fraud is 
not available.  
The fourth segment of the 2002 ILEP conference also included a 
discussion of the use of court-sponsored auctions to select class counsel. 
The discussion was stimulated by Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s Article that 
is published here.57 Professor Bebchuk is an imaginative and prolific 
scholar who brings the teachings of law and economics to bear on a wide 
range of corporate law and related issues. Since his Article was presented, 
there have been a number of important developments affecting the debate 
about auctions, chiefly the issuance of the final report of an influential 
Third Circuit Task Force.58 The Article and those developments provide 
 53. Id. at 884. 
 54. Id. (citation omitted). 
 55. Id.  
 56. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 57. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Auctioning Counsel Positions in Securities 
Class Actions, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 889 (2002). Because Professor Bebchuk could not attend the ILEP 
conference, Professor Theodore Eisenberg presented his paper.  
 58. See THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, FINAL REPORT (Jan. 
2002), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/final%20report%20of%20third%20 
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reason to doubt that auctions should or will play an important role in the 
class actions of the future or that they have virtually any role to play in 
securities class actions under the PSLRA. Even if that is true, however, the 
phenomenon remains of interest because it illustrates more general 
features of today’s litigation landscape in the federal courts. 
In 1996 I expressed the view that the most important developments in 
civil justice over the preceding two decades had concerned power and 
argued that we had seen two related shifts in power within the landscape 
of federal civil procedure in that period. First, there was a shift in the locus 
of lawmaking power, as Congress insisted that it had a proper role to play 
in devising the rules of the game. Second, there was a shift in the locus of 
power at the trial (or pretrial) level, as trial judges insisted on playing a 
more active role in the game; that is, in the conduct of civil cases.59 The 
experience with auctions can be seen as an illustration of the phenomena I 
described in 1996, as well as of the value of the general perspective.  
Granting that federal courts have a special, although not unique, 
responsibility to protect the interests of clients who are members of a 
class, should one not draw a distinction between (1) court action designed 
either to regulate the existing market for legal services when it proves 
inadequate to serve the interests of the class as a whole or to referee 
existing competition between or among counsel and (2) an attempt by a 
court to create a new market according to the court’s sense of the relevant 
criteria and declare a winner of the competition that it has elicited? From 
this perspective auctions are the cousins of managerial judging and of 
sanctions, another step in the move to empower federal judges at the 
expense of lawyers and their clients.60 
Some of these steps in the power struggle between the federal courts 
and lawyers over the conduct of litigation landed the judiciary in hot water 
in Congress, spurred on by lawyers whose oxen had been gored, which is 
why I regard the two shifts in power as related.61 Moreover, in my 1996 
article I described the PSLRA as a fire alarm for those who still wish to 
contend for a monopoly of power in the federal judiciary to fashion the 
circuit%20task%20force.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Mark v. Cal. Pub. Emple. Ret. Sys., 122 S. Ct. 1300 (2002), in which 
the Third Circuit disapproved auctions for almost all cases subject to the PSLRA, was decided before 
the Task Force’s report. For a subsequent decision of the Ninth Circuit taking a similar approach to the 
PSLRA, see In re David Cavanaugh et al., 2002 WL 31051543; id. at n.19. 
 59. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 224-26. 
 60. See Burbank, Costs of Complexity, supra note 28, at 1478; see also Stephen B. Burbank, 
Foreword: Causes and Limits of Pessimism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1851, 1856 (2000).  
 61. See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 28, at 514-16. 
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rules of the game.62 Some of the decisions in which federal judges have 
ordered auctions in PSLRA cases indicate (were that required!) that the 
judiciary does not yield power without a fight.63 If past is prologue, 
acceptance of the Task Force’s recommendations would diminish the risk 
of congressional action on auctions, as would acceptance of the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA in the Cendant case.64 
The fifth and last program segment of the 2002 ILEP conference 
examined the extent to which litigation reform can and should be effected 
by new or amended court rules given that institution’s history and the 
demands of contemporary American politics. We were fortunate to have 
an immensely talented group of panelists to guide the discussion.  
For two decades, Professor Richard Marcus has studied and written 
about federal practice and procedure with a sense of timing as to what is 
really important and a nuanced appreciation of the interplay of doctrine 
and litigation behavior that are unequalled among scholars of procedure. 
Fortunately, the federal judiciary has come to recognize his talents, with 
the result that he is now a central figure in the real world of rulemaking.65 
His Article is presented here.66  
The commentators were no less distinguished. Suffice it to say of Judge 
Patrick Higginbotham that, as Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee in the early 1990s, he sought to rescue the enterprise from the 
twin evils of ignorance and arrogance, proving again that politics need not 
be a dirty word (and that the federal judiciary desperately needs more 
effective politicians).67 Allen Black is quite simply one of the best and 
most thoughtful lawyers in the country, a highly successful litigator and 
important contributor to numerous law reform efforts. After Judge Shira 
Scheindlin agreed to serve on the securities class actions panel, we 
realized that we had in her, a member of the Civil Rules Advisory 
 62. See id. at 516. 
 63. See, e.g., In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp.2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 64. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., supra note 58. 
 65. Professor Marcus has served since 1996 “as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules and worked on its review of discovery and class action rules.” Richard L. Marcus, Reform 
Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 903 n.13 (2002). 
 66. Marcus, supra note 65. 
 67. See Stephen B. Burbank, Making Progress the Old-Fashioned Way, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1231, 1234-35 (2001) (defining politics as “the art of seeking to improve the human condition through 
intelligence, patience, persuasion, and compromise”). Charles Clark, the original and long-serving 
Reporter for Civil Rules, was thus no politician. See Charles C. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 1938-58, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 448 (1958) 
(“reformers must follow their dream and leave compromise to others”), quoted in Marcus, supra note 
65, at 903. This does not appear to be a judgment dependent upon an idiosyncratic definition. See, e.g., 
KALMAN, supra note 6, at 115-20; Schlegel, supra note 6, at 312. 
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Committee, a double threat, and we thus prevailed on her also to serve on 
the panel for this segment, to which she made important contributions. 
Professor Marcus’s Article is typical of his work: informed and 
judicious—one might even say old-fashioned.68 But it is also decidedly not 
old-fashioned in seeking to understand the rulemaking experience by 
reference to larger contexts, including one drawn from interdisciplinary 
scholarship.69  
Although it may have taken the organized federal judiciary too long to 
grasp the risks run in seeking to attempt broad-scale reform of litigation 
through rulemaking, as Professor Marcus’s paper makes clear, that 
message has been received, as also has the message that reason and the 
rulemakers’ collective experience are no longer an acceptable basis for 
change.70 He is quite correct to question the circumstances in which, and 
the form in which, systematically collected empirical data should be 
required before rulemaking can properly proceed. But, again, those are the 
when and how questions rather than whether, which seems to me evidence 
of progress.71 At the Conference Mr. Black contended that the rulemakers 
had not been sufficiently careful in selecting the objects of their reform 
efforts, taking their cue too often from the anecdotal complaints of small 
segments of the bar. Together with Marcus’s perception that there is a risk 
of precommitment once a proposal for change is published for comment, it 
may suggest that more attention needs to be given to bringing data to bear 
on the question whether a problem worthy of the rulemakers’ attention 
exists.72  
Were I to hazard any criticism of Professor Marcus’s Article, it would 
be that he remains, for my taste, a bit too old-fashioned in the apparent 
nostalgia he feels for the simpler days when the experts controlled the 
process, Congress was essentially indifferent to it, and everyone had to 
live with the results. Put another way, he seems resigned to accept that 
 68. This is a compliment. See Burbank, supra note 67. 
 69. See Marcus, supra note 65, at 908-34; see also ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 
(2001). This is also a compliment. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, J. LEGAL 
EDUC. (forthcoming 2003). 
 70. See Burbank, supra note 60. 
 71. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 72.  
The Advisory Committee [responsible for proposing the 1983 amendments to Rule 11] knew 
little about experience under the original Rule, knew little about the perceived problems that 
stimulated the efforts leading to the two packages of Rules amendments in 1980 and 1983, 
knew little about the jurisprudence of sanctions, and knew little about the costs and benefits 
of sanctions as a case management device.  
Burbank, supra note 44, at 1927.  
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“many features of contemporary rulemaking resemble the aspects of 
American government that Professor Kagan describes.”73  
Two of the commentators might have been thought to make a similar 
point, albeit for different reasons and from different perspectives. Thus, 
Judge Higginbotham observed that the “giants” of whom Professor 
Marcus speaks could not foresee the external forces that would interact 
with their product, and more generally that the fate of the rules is 
controlled by forces outside the rulemaking process. In sum, he contended, 
reforming the rules of procedure is not the same thing as using rules to 
reform litigation.74 Judge Scheindlin, in turn, reminded us that the 
composition of the rulemaking bodies is determined from the top down, 
that with those selections comes the power to determine the agenda, and 
that interest groups know how an organized effort can also help to 
determine the agenda. From either Judge Higginbotham’s or Judge 
Scheindlin’s perspective, the messy and decentralized system Professor 
Kagan describes may appear in a different light, and resignation may seem 
an inappropriately tepid reaction. 
But this is probably nothing more than a matter of taste. Professor 
Marcus’s Article is a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the state of 
contemporary federal supervisory court rulemaking, of interest to 
practitioners, judges, and scholars. It is, in sum, just what the organizers of 
the 2002 ILEP conference had hoped it would be. 
* * * * 
With all the attention in the media and in our legislatures, state and 
federal, to the supposed costs of civil litigation, it is important periodically 
to remind ourselves of its potential benefits.75 Moreover, as the Articles 
presented here suggest, whether the question is costs or benefits, the 
responsible course is to seek data in preference to anecdotes and to 
recognize that data require sober interpretation (for which additional 
research may be required). These Articles also suggest that an appreciation 
 73. Marcus, supra note 65, at 942. 
 74. See id. at 902 n.10; see also Burbank, supra note 60, at 1856 (“[A]ny attempt to reduce the 
expense of litigation can be defeated by the entrepreneurial ingenuity of the bar until such time as 
reformers directly alter the mechanisms by which the bar is compensated. In this country, of course, 
that would require legislation.”) (footnotes omitted). Judge Higginbotham also lamented the apparent 
view of contemporary rulemakers that a trial is a failure, which yields efforts akin to “sweeping the 
floor while the roof is on fire.” 
 75. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (book review), 79 JUDICATURE 
318 (1996). 
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of either the costs or benefits of litigation, as of the roles that it plays and 
should play, may be facilitated by, and in an increasingly interdependent 
world sometimes requires, a comparative perspective. 
Whether or not a desired change in litigation behavior finds support in 
documented experience, these Articles tell us that there are limits to the 
power of the judiciary to be the source of authority and, indeed, of the 
power of formal rules, whatever their source, to actually bring it about.76 
Thank goodness, because the forces of personal and institutional self-
interest are so strong in this country that one who calls for attention to 
facts in at least some forms of lawmaking may indeed be baying at the 
moon,77 while power is distributed so unequally that the messy, 
decentralized system in which we live may be our best protection against 
improvident change.  
 76. Cf. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 
J. LEGAL STUDIES 721, 746 (1994) (“Judicial independence is not primarily a matter of constitutional 
text.”). 
 77. “[M]embers of the political branches have different utility functions than do federal judges, 
and the rules of the game they play, including their norms of accountability, do not put a high premium 
on rationality.” Burbank, supra note 39, at 2008 (footnote omitted). 
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